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INTRODUCTION 
Uber1 has been a visionary in the transportation industry since 2009, effectively creating 
the concept of ride-sharing and pioneering other innovative solutions in transportation.  Since late 
2014, Uber has been one of the companies leading the charge in self-driving technology, 
investing hundreds of millions of dollars in unique technology and hiring the best and brightest in 
the field.  Uber created a revolution in the ride-sharing space through hard work, creativity, and 
pride in its own innovation.  It is this same philosophy and drive that Uber is now applying to its 
work on self-driving vehicles.   
Waymo’s2 preliminary injunction motion is a misfire.  Both of its central premises—that 
former Waymo employees brought thousands of confidential Waymo documents to Uber to build 
a copycat LiDAR and that Uber’s LiDAR closely mimics Waymo’s single-lens design—are 
demonstrably false.  A search of Uber’s computers has not yielded any of the 14,000 files Waymo 
alleges that Uber misappropriated.  Uber made sure to have policies and practices in place to 
prevent misappropriation, and these measures have worked.  
The self-proclaimed innovation of Waymo’s LiDAR is its single-lens design, touted by 
Waymo as a “game-changer.”  Uber’s LiDAR design is fundamentally different; it is, instead, a 
four-lens design, with two lenses for transmitting laser light and two for receiving it.  This fact 
alone demonstrates the misguided nature of Waymo’s request for “extraordinary and drastic 
relief.”  Waymo took one Uber schematic (inadvertently sent to a Waymo employee) and made 
several assumptions based on that one document to conclude that Uber’s LiDAR used a 
single-lens design.  Waymo could not be more wrong, and Uber’s design could not be more 
different.  And no wonder—Uber’s LiDAR was developed by a different team, using a different 
beam pattern, and leveraging different know-how.   
And this is not the only fundamental difference between the two designs.  Uber’s design 
uses two optical cavities, compared to just one cavity in Waymo’s unit.  Importantly, Uber began 
developing its LiDAR design before it hired Anthony Levandowski.  Waymo cannot show that 
                                                 
1 “Uber” refers to Uber Technologies, Inc., Ottomotto LLC, and Otto Trucking LLC. 
2 “Waymo” refers to Waymo LLC, Google Inc., and Alphabet Inc. 
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Uber misappropriated Waymo’s trade secrets or infringed Waymo’s patents.  A cursory 
inspection of Uber’s LiDAR and Waymo’s allegations fall like a house of cards. 
And there is more: Waymo has been sitting on the information that underpins its 
allegations of downloads of Waymo documents since October, but filed suit only in February and 
filed this motion only in March.  Waymo’s delay militates strongly against granting an injunction.  
Moreover, there is no commercial urgency—Uber’s LiDAR is still in development, and  
   
To be sure, Uber finds itself in a complicated situation:  it is unambiguously developing 
its own technology independent of Waymo, but its employee Mr. Levandowski is accused of 
downloading 14,000 files from Waymo before he joined Uber.  Uber is blocked at this stage from 
providing an explanation against that accusation because Mr. Levandowski has asserted his Fifth 
Amendment constitutional rights.  Faced with Mr. Levandowski’s assertion of his constitutional 
privileges, the Court has stated that it is considering entering an injunction.  Such an injunction is 
not necessary against Uber because there is no evidence that any downloaded files ever made it 
onto Uber’s systems.  Even if the Court disagrees as to the need for some injunction, given the 
current facts—and more to come after Uber conducts further searches, and Waymo deposes Uber 
employees who can attest to never seeing, much less using, Waymo files at Uber—the Court 
should not enjoin Uber’s independent research on important new technology.  
The Court also should not draw an adverse inference that Uber engaged in wrongdoing 
with respect to trade secrets by virtue of Mr. Levandowski’s assertion of his rights.  Whether to 
draw an adverse inference is a question that must be examined on a “case-by-case basis under the 
microscope of the circumstances of that particular civil litigation.”3  It is not permissible to draw 
an adverse inference unless there is “independent evidence of the fact about which” an individual 
declines to testify.4  The record here shows that no independent evidence of the alleged use of 
trade secrets exists.  On the contrary, the record shows that Uber never possessed—and never 
used—any information Mr. Levandowski allegedly took from Waymo.  
                                                 
3 Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Richards, 541 F.3d 903, 912 (9th Cir. 2008). 
4 Id. 
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Finally, there is the other side of the equation—the harm to Uber and to the public—if 
Waymo’s motion is granted.  To hinder Uber’s continued progress in its independent 
development of an in-house LiDAR that is fundamentally different than Waymo’s, when Uber 
has not used any of Waymo’s trade secrets, would impede Uber’s efforts to remain a viable 
business, stifle the talent and ingenuity that are the primary drivers of this emerging industry, and 
risk delaying the implementation of technology that could prevent car accidents.  Ultimately, that 
would be harmful to the public.  When all factors are considered, the scales of justice tilt heavily 
in favor of denying this motion.    
FACTS 
I. UBER IS THE LEADER IN THE RIDE-SHARING INDUSTRY  
Uber is the pioneer and recognized leader in the urban transportation business.  It has the 
world’s largest ride-sharing network, serving more than 55 million monthly active riders in 
574 cities.  (Chang Decl. ¶ 4.)5  Founded in 2009, Uber revolutionized transportation when it 
introduced its groundbreaking smartphone app.  (Id.)  What started as an app to request premium 
black cars in a few metropolitan areas is now changing the logistical fabric of cities around the 
world.  (Id.)  With the push of a button, riders can now reliably get an affordable ride across 
town.6  Uber has also made carpooling a reality, helping to reduce congestion and pollution.  (Id.)   
Seeking to further its mission to deliver safe, accessible, and reliable transportation to the 
world, Uber has built one of the strongest autonomous vehicle engineering groups in the industry, 
leveraging the experience that comes from running ridesharing services in hundreds of cities and 
the data and intelligence that comes from doing 1.2 billion miles on the road every month.  (Id.)    
II. UBER INDEPENDENTLY DEVELOPED ITS OWN LIDAR TECHNOLOGY 
In February 2015, Uber began building its autonomous vehicle engineering group by 
partnering with Carnegie Mellon University and establishing its Advanced Technologies Center 
(“ATC”) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  Uber hired Scott Boehmke to research and develop 
autonomous vehicle technology.  (Boehmke Decl. ¶ 2.)  Mr. Boehmke was never employed by 
                                                 
5(Chang Decl. Ex. 2, https://www.uber.com/our-story/.) 
6(Chang Decl. Ex. 3 https://newsroom.uber.com/rethinking-transportation.) 
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Waymo.  (Id.)  Mr. Boehmke began meeting with LiDAR sensor manufacturers in early 2015.  
(Id. ¶ 4.)  On April 17, 2015, Mr. Boehmke prepared his first analysis of the field of view and 
beam spacing requirements for autonomous vehicles.  (Id.)  He quickly recognized that the 
vertical field of view and resolution requirements for a LiDAR were heavily dependent on the 
speed of the vehicle.  (Id. ¶ 6.)  As a result, he concluded that it might be necessary to adjust the 
angular spacing in the vertical dimension based on the speed of the vehicle.  (Id.) 
In October 2015, Mr. Boehmke reviewed various LiDAR sensors, including  
which could be customized to create a , in which the 
laser diodes that .  (Id. ¶ 8.)  By 
November 2015, Mr. Boehmke had also decided to use separate lenses for the transmit and 
receive paths.  (Id. ¶ 12.)      
By late 2015, Uber had decided to develop a customized LiDAR in partnership with 
—long before Uber’s acquisition of Mr. Levandowski’s company.  (Id. ¶ 9.)  Between 
November 2015 and March 2016, Mr. Boehmke worked on developing a custom beam pattern for 
a LiDAR suited for Uber’s automotive use.  (Id.)  In March 2016, Uber’s ATC entered into a 
contract with , which Uber 
would combine into a “dual stack” LiDAR to provide 64-channel resolution, based on Uber’s 
custom beam pattern.  (Id.)  , but during that time, 
Mr. Boehmke experimented with the positioning and orientation of lasers on as few boards as 
possible for an in-house LiDAR, to simplify alignment and calibration.  (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.)   
In August 2016, Uber acquired Ottomotto, a company co-founded by Anthony 
Levandowski, which originally focused on self-driving trucks.  Uber acquired Ottomotto for its 
expert personnel, not trade secrets; in fact, all Ottomotto employees signed offer letters and 
attestations swearing that they would not bring any other company’s trade secrets to Uber or use 
them in connection with their Uber work.  To be clear, Uber never had possession of or used any 
of Waymo’s trade secrets or the 14,000 files that Waymo alleges Mr. Levandowski downloaded.   
After Uber’s acquisition of Ottomotto, its existing ATC team merged with Ottomotto’s 
team to form the Advanced Technologies Group (“ATG”).  A few months prior, Ottomotto had 
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acquired Tyto LiDAR, LLC (“Tyto”), a startup dedicated to developing remote sensing 
technologies for the geospatial industry.  The Tyto team, which included James Haslim, who was 
never employed by Waymo, became part of Uber’s self-driving car team.  (Haslim Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) 
The newly minted ATG team at Uber decided to revisit the dual 32-channel diode-based 
LiDAR concept that Mr. Boehmke had worked on in late 2015 and early 2016, for its in-house 
mid-range LiDAR solution.  (Boehmke Decl. ¶ 16.)  This project was code-named “Fuji,” after 
Mount Fuji.  (Haslim Decl. ¶ 5.)  On November 4, 2016, Mr. Boehmke provided Mr. Haslim and 
his team with a custom beam pattern for Fuji, based on Mr. Boehmke’s earlier work.  (Boehmke 
Decl. ¶ 18; Haslim Decl. ¶ 18.) 
During this development, Mr. Haslim and his team decided to use two cavities for Fuji, to 
allow two laser diodes—one from each cavity—to fire simultaneously.  (Haslim Decl. ¶ 8.) The 
team first attempted to place all 32 laser diodes on a single transmit board.  (Id. ¶ 11.)  Through 
trial and error, they realized that  
 
 
 
  The position and orientation of the diodes on the transmit boards in Fuji were based on the 
custom beam spacing and angles provided by Mr. Boehmke.  (Id. ¶ 18.) The Fuji design was 
largely the result of the collaboration between Mr. Boehmke and Mr. Haslim and their teams—
neither of whom ever worked for Waymo.  (Boehmke Decl. ¶ 2; Haslim Decl. ¶ 3.) 
Although Uber is developing its own LiDAR,  
.  Every single self-driving car that Uber has put on the road to 
date uses commercially available LiDAR sensors from third parties.  (Haslim Decl. ¶ 21.) 
III. UBER’S FUJI LIDAR IS SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM WAYMO’S 
 LIDAR 
 
The Fuji LiDAR system that Mr. Haslim and Mr. Boehmke developed is dramatically 
different from Waymo’s  LiDAR in numerous respects, beginning with the fact that  is 
a monostatic system (single transmit/receive lens) while Fuji is a dual bistatic system (two 
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LiDAR cavities, each with separate transmit and receive lenses, for a total of four lenses).  The 
chart below highlights some of the major differences between the systems (details are provided in 
the expert declarations of Dr. McManamon and Dr. Lebby): 
Comparison of Systems
 LiDAR Fuji LiDAR
Single lens aperture:  Single shared 
lens for transmitted and received light. 
 
Single cavity:  Overlapping transmit 
and receive paths in single cavity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Four lens apertures:  Separate lenses for each 
of 2 transmit paths and 2 receive paths. 
 
Two cavities:  Separate medium-range and long-
range cavities, each with separate transmit and 
receive paths. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. LEGAL STANDARD 
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be 
granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”7  To establish a 
right to a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate that:  (1) it is likely to succeed on 
the merits; (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary relief; (3) the balance of 
equities tips in its favor; and (4) the injunction is in the public interest.8 
“[A] plaintiff must prove each element of the preliminary injunction test to prevail at the 
district court.”9  “[T]he absence of an adequate showing on any one factor may suffice, on 
balance, to justify the denial of the injunction.”10  Likewise, the Ninth Circuit recognizes that 
Waymo must establish each of the four Winter factors to prevail on its motion for injunctive 
relief.11  A preliminary injunction is improper if the movant fails to establish likelihood of success 
on the merits or likelihood of irreparable harm.12  Here, Waymo fails on both counts. 
II. WAYMO IS UNLIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS OF ITS TRADE 
SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION, PATENT INFRINGEMENT, AND UNFAIR 
BUSINESS PRACTICES CLAIMS 
A. Waymo Is Not Likely to Prevail on Its Trade Secrets Claims. 
Waymo alleges that Defendants misappropriated its proprietary and confidential 
information in violation of the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”) and the federal 
Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”).  In order to demonstrate a likelihood of success on its trade 
secret claim under CUTSA or DTSA, a plaintiff must show both:  (1) the existence of a trade 
secret and (2) misappropriation of the trade secret.13  Waymo cannot. 
To establish misappropriation, a plaintiff must establish “[d]isclosure or use of a trade 
                                                 
7 Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (emphasis in the original).   
8 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. 
City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1054 (9th Cir. 2009). 
9 Trebro Mfg., Inc. v. Firefly Equip., LLC, 748 F.3d 1159, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
10 Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951, 953 (Fed. Cir. 
1990).   
11 All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).   
12 Jack Guttman, Inc. v. Kopycake Enters., Inc., 302 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
13 AccuImage Diagnostics Corp. v. Terarecon, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 941, 950 (N.D. Cal. 
2003); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1836. 
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secret of another without express or implied consent” or “[a]cquisition of a trade secret of another 
by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper 
means.”14  The standards are identical under the DTSA.15  Moreover, under both the CUTSA and 
DTSA, independent derivation is a complete defense to alleged trade-secret misappropriation.16   
Waymo contends it obtained proof of the alleged misappropriation when it received a 
December 13, 2016 email with a drawing of an Uber printed circuit board.  As demonstrated 
below, that email contains no such proof. 17  Rather, it reflects Uber’s independently developed 
design, and any similarities between the two systems are drawn from concepts that are publicly 
known or from techniques within the toolkit of one of skill in the art. 
1. Defendants Did Not Improperly Acquire Any Alleged Confidential 
Information. 
 
There is no evidence that Uber acquired—improperly or otherwise—the alleged trade 
secrets.  First and foremost, Uber and its employees have never used any alleged confidential 
Waymo files from Mr. Levandowski or anyone else in the development of its LiDAR systems.  
Indeed, Waymo’s witnesses testified that  
 
 
   
Forensic analysis confirms that none of Waymo’s documents crossed over to Uber.  
(Faulkner Decl. ¶ 7.)  Uber conducted 86 custodial interviews of former Waymo employees, 
which established that none of these employees was aware of any Waymo confidential 
information on Uber’s computer systems.  Uber then conducted a search of all Uber-issued 
laptops belonging to former Waymo employees.  (Id. ¶¶ 4-6.)  In all, 106.5 terabytes of data were 
                                                 
14 Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(b). 
15 See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5); 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6). 
16 Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(a) (“Reverse engineering or independent derivation alone shall not 
be considered improper means.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6). 
17 This email cannot be the smoking gun Waymo claims it is, because the assumptions Waymo 
draws from it are false.  For instance, Waymo repeatedly argues that the architecture of the board 
necessitates a single-lens design, which Uber does not use. 
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imaged.  (Id. ¶ 4.)  Uber searched data belonging to Messrs. Levandowski, Kshirsagar, and 
Raduta, as well as that of seven other former Waymo employees who worked on Chauffeur or 
LiDAR sensors, for the approximately 14,000 filenames and hash values identified by Waymo as 
corresponding to allegedly downloaded files, as well as the filenames included in Waymo’s 
preliminary injunction papers.  (Id. ¶ 5.)  In addition, Uber used search terms derived from 
Waymo’s preliminary injunction papers.  (Id. ¶ 6.)  These searches did not reveal any confidential 
Waymo material on Uber’s systems.  (Id. ¶ 7.)  Moreover, Uber took strict precautions to ensure 
that no trade secrets belonging to a former employer would be brought to or used at Uber.  
(Morgan Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.)  On these facts, Waymo is unable to meet its burden of showing that Uber 
improperly acquired Waymo’s trade secrets.  
Waymo tries to raise an inference of improper use by claiming that the employees 
downloaded files during the course of their employment at Waymo, but this is not an out-of-
bounds practice for Waymo or Google employees.  Indeed, the fact that Messrs. Levandowski, 
Kshirsagar, and Raduta had legitimate access to Waymo’s confidential information before their 
separation is insufficient to establish that they improperly acquired that information.18   
Mr. Kshirsagar, for example, explained that every single one of the files he accessed was 
done for legitimate purposes relating to his employment at Waymo.19  Specifically, 
Mr. Kshirsagar accessed two of the files at issue on his Waymo-issued laptop in order to prepare 
a transition memorandum for several of his successors.  (Kshirsagar Decl. ¶¶ 10-11.)  He prepared 
the memorandum at the direction of Tim Willis, ironically the very person who now accuses him 
of accessing the files improperly.  (Kshirsagar Decl. ¶ 10.)  The documents are referenced in the 
transition memorandum itself.  (Id.)  Mr. Kshirsagar accessed an additional file on his Waymo-
                                                 
18 See Cent. Valley Gen. Hosp. v. Smith, 162 Cal. App. 4th 501, 528–29 (2008) (mere 
possession of a trade secret does not constitute misappropriation); see also FLIR Sys., Inc. v. 
Parrish, 174 Cal. App. 4th 1270, 1279 (2009) (“Mere possession of trade secrets by a departing 
employee is not enough for an injunction.”). 
19 Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Victor, No. C 13-4240 SBA, 2014 WL 492364, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 5, 2014) (holding that “simple fact that [former employee] emailed himself . . . proprietary 
information” for the purpose of “ensuring that [former employer] properly paid him for all 
commissions owed,” “without more, does not show misappropriation” and did not warrant 
preliminary injunction). 
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issued laptop for general educational purposes in the course of his work at Waymo.  (Id. ¶ 13.)  
Mr. Kshirsagar then returned his Waymo laptop to the Waymo IT department when he left, and 
did not take it or the files with him.  (Kshirsagar Decl. ¶¶ 11, 13 & Ex. 1.)  Mr. Kshirsagar 
accessed two additional files on his Waymo-issued laptop that he then emailed to his personal 
mobile device to review them offline while he was still at Waymo for the purpose of fulfilling his 
duties to Waymo—a practice that Mr. Willis himself admits he engages in on occasion—and 
never once accessed those files after he left his employment at Waymo.  (See Kshirsagar Decl. 
¶¶ 12-13; Chang Decl. Ex. 4, Willis Dep. 46:10–17.)     
Moreover, while Waymo makes much of the 14,000 files that Mr. Levandowski allegedly 
downloaded, Waymo admits that this represents the entire Waymo SVN repository, 
demonstrating that Mr. Levandowski did not “pick and choose” which files to download.  Waymo 
further admits that  
 
 
 
 
Finally, Mr. Radu Raduta is only accused of .  (Willis 
Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 24-16.)  Like with Mr. Kshirsagar, what Waymo failed to tell the Court is 
that  
.  (See Chang Decl. Ex. 5, Brown Dep. 39:11–19; 41:15–42:5.)  None of those files were 
located on Mr. Raduta’s Uber-issued devices.  (Faulkner Decl. ¶ 7.)  Moreover, the  
  (Willis Decl. Exs. G–I, ECF Nos. 24-23, 
24-24, 24-25.)  As this Court noted, there is no showing that these documents comprise trade 
secrets at all.  (CMC Hr’g Tr. 7, Mar. 29, 2017, ECF No. 131.)   
   
Not a trade secret.  In its motion, Waymo alleges that the  
 is a trade secret that “has not been disclosed to the public” and that Uber’s design, 
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as reflected in the December 13, 2016 email, contains such spacing and orientation.  (Mot. 11.)  
The concept of , however, is expressly recited 
in Velodyne’s U.S. Patent No. 8,767,190 (the “’190 patent”), titled “High Definition LiDAR 
System.”  The ’190 patent discloses that the density of laser diodes within a curved pattern around 
a central axis (i.e., a “fan pattern”) can be varied to achieve greater resolution at longer distances.  
(’190 patent at 5:56-57.)  The patent states:  “The density of emitter/detector pairs populated 
along the vertical FOV is intentionally variable.”  (’190 patent at 6:45-46.)  The patent further 
explains:  “For some uses increased density is desirable to facilitate seeing objects at further 
distances and with more vertical resolution.”  (Id. at 6:54-56.)   
 
. Because the concept of  is 
in the public domain, Waymo cannot claim it as a trade secret.20 
No misappropriation due to independent derivation.  Waymo has failed to demonstrate 
that the  is a trade secret, but even if it was 
shown to be a trade secret, Uber independently developed the  
 on its Fuji system, based on the  
that Scott Boehmke developed, using parameters and calculations that he began developing in 
December 2015—before Mr. Levandowski had even left Waymo and before Uber’s acquisition of 
Otto.21  As Waymo’s Mr. Droz testified during deposition,  
 
  (Chang Decl. Ex. 7, Droz 
Dep. 107:3-108:10.)  Moreover, the  on Uber’s Fuji transmit boards 
are not the same as those in Waymo’s boards.  If Uber had copied Waymo’s design, the 
                                                 
20 Bladeroom Grp. Ltd. v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:15-cv-01370-EJD, 2015 WL 8028294, at *4 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2015) (“[i]t is well established that the disclosure of a trade secret in a patent 
places the information comprising the secret into the public domain.”); On-Line Techs., Inc. v. 
Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer, GMBH, 386 F.3d 1133, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“After a patent has 
issued, the information contained within it is ordinarily regarded as public and not subject to 
protection as a trade secret.”) 
21 Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.1(a); 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6) (independent derivation defense). 
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—the result of painstaking, iterative testing and simulation—should 
be the same, but they are not.  For these reasons, each of which independently negates Waymo’s 
trade secret claim, Waymo cannot show that it is likely to succeed on the merits of this claim. 
  
Not a trade secret due to prior public knowledge and use.  Waymo also alleges that  
 
 is a trade secret.  (Mot. 11, 15.)  Waymo’s  arrangement is one of a limited 
number of workable configurations for the transmit block of any 64-laser LiDAR system that a 
designer would evaluate in light of well-known design considerations, particularly the desire to 
reduce the size, cost, and complexity of the system.  A “general approach” that is “dictated by 
well known principles of physics” is not protectable under accepted trade secret doctrine because 
such principles are not “secret”—they are instead “general engineering principles in the public 
domain and part of the intellectual equipment of technical employees.”22  
No misappropriation due to no use.  Notwithstanding the obviousness of the 
configuration, and unlike Waymo’s , Uber’s Fuji system does not contain a  
transmit stack.  Rather, the Fuji system comprises two separate LiDAR cavities,  
 
 
.  Because there is no evidence of 
use of the  transmit stack in Fuji, a preliminary injunction is improper.23 
Additionally, the  is different in the Fuji 
system from that of .  The 64 diodes in the  system are distributed in 
the following pattern:  .  Waymo claims that positioning the  
 is a trade secret.  As noted, the  of the Fuji system are 
independent transmit blocks and do not constitute a .  However, considered 
                                                 
22 Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 139 (9th Cir. 1965). 
23 Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (denying 
preliminary injunction where plaintiff failed to demonstrate “specific evidence of actual use”). 
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together, the distribution of diodes across Fuji’s transmit PCBs is:    (Haslim 
Decl. ¶ 13.)   
No misappropriation due to independent development.  Not only does Fuji not use a 
, its  design in each of two cavities was independently 
developed.  As described previously, Mr. Haslim’s team decided to use  in 
each of Fuji’s two cavities after realizing, through trial and error, that neither a  
 
 
, as it was the most symmetric way of 
distributing .  (Id.)  Because Uber’s Fuji design is fundamentally 
different from Waymo’s design and because Uber independently developed its two-cavity, 
 design, Waymo cannot prevail on its trade secret claim. 
  
No misappropriation due to independent development and no use.  Waymo alleges that 
the design of Uber’s Fuji transmit PCB was adapted from design files for Waymo’s  
.  This allegation is based on a comparison of Waymo’s  to a 
machine drawing of what is purportedly an Otto PCB that Waymo inadvertently received by 
email from the vendor .  A comparison of the PCBs and a review of the Fuji 
development history make clear that the Fuji PCB was not adapted from the Waymo design.  
(Lebby Decl. ¶ 61.) 
First, as explained above, Fuji’s transmit PCBs and its  for the 
transmit block were independently developed by Uber engineers who had no connection with the 
allegedly misappropriated Waymo confidential documents.   
Second, an inspection of the two PCBs side-by-side reveals numerous design differences, 
including:  (1) different shape and curvature along the curved edge of the PCBs; (2) different 
 of the laser diodes; (3) different arrangement of the components behind the 
diodes; (4) different components and layouts on the side of the PCBs nearest the flat edge; and 
(5) different arrangement of holes in the PCBs.  (Lebby Decl. ¶ 61.) 
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Third, because the Fuji system has a  
, the precise positioning and angles of the diodes on the transmit PCBs are different.  (Id. 
¶ 62.)  Fuji’s  
.  (Id.)  By contrast, the 
 design has a .  (Id.)  These differences in vertical 
FOV dictated a different design for the Fuji transmit PCBs.   
  
Not a trade secret due to prior public knowledge and use.  Waymo alleges that the 
concept of  is a trade secret.  
(Mot. 11, 14.)  The  is 
a known design choice in the fabrication of laser diode systems and has been disclosed in the 
public technical literature.  For example, a textbook on the subject of semiconductor lasers 
illustrates  and notes the technical concerns associated 
with each:  “Overhang and underhang characterize the alignment between the diode laser die . . . 
and the mounting substrate.  The consequence of overhang and underhang is ineffective heat 
conduction and blockage of light transmission, respectively.”24  In addition, a 2007 dissertation 
on laser diode systems describes a system in which laser diodes are deliberately  
, in order to avoid obstruction of the laser light—the 
very goal that Waymo aims to achieve with its alleged trade secret.25  Thus, Waymo cannot claim 
the  as a trade secret.26 
  
No misappropriation due to no use.  Waymo claims as a trade secret the concept of  
 
  (Mot. 11, 15-16.)  Uber’s Fuji transmit board, however, does not use  
                                                 
24 (LebbyDecl. Ex. 4, Xingsheng Liu et al., Packaging of High Power Semiconductor Lasers 
224 (2015).) 
25 (Lebby Decl. Ex. 5, Christian Scholz, Thermal & Mech. Optimisation of Diode Laser Bar 
Packaging 28 (2007) (emphasis added).)   
26 Winston Research Corp, 350 F.2d at 139 (“general engineering principles in the public 
domain and part of the intellectual equipment of technical employees” are not trade secrets). 
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.  Rather, it uses fiducial reference marks that are printed 
on the circuit board—a common technique in the fabrication of printed circuit boards and 
mounting of optical components on a circuit board.  (Haslim Decl. ¶ 14.)  Waymo’s witness 
Mr. Droz emphasized that  
—something that Uber does not use the guide 
holes for. 
Not a trade secret due to public disclosure.  Moreover, the use of  for these 
purposes is not a protectable trade secret.  The concept of  
 is as simple and as general as a Tinker Toy, 
and such general concepts dictated by basic scientific principles cannot be trade secrets.  In fact, 
the concept of using  in the LiDAR context has been known to 
the public since the 1970s, as conceded by Waymo’s witness  
  For example, a patent filed in 1976 describes a “means suitable for 
aligning and mounting a printed circuit board (PCB)” that involves mounting a “PCB [that] is 
provided with holes spaced apart to receive the supporting member pins” on top of a supporting 
member in which the “pins are spaced apart along a datum line or center line to which the PCB is 
to be aligned.”27  Similarly, a German patent application filed in 1980 described how “[p]rinted 
circuit boards that are stacked and compacted into multi-layer circuit boards require to be 
accurately aligned,” and the use of “bored holes” that “all the holes will have an exact relative 
position to one another.”28 
Similarly,  is a well-known concept in the 
field.  For example, U.S. Patent No.  4,432,037, with a priority date of December 2, 1980, entitled 
“Multi-layer printed circuit board and method for determining the actual position of internally 
located terminal areas,” describes a “fitting or alignment system” that consists of “location holes 
which fix a reference point and a reference line from which the position determination of the 
                                                 
27 (Lebby Decl. Ex. 6, U.S. Patent No. 4,244,109 at 1:8-9, 1:65-68.) 
28 (Lebby Decl. Ex. 7, German Pat. App. No. DE 3031103, Abstract.) 
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conductive patterns on the individual sheets [of printed circuit board layer] takes place.”29  In this 
known solution, the “conductive patterns of the individual inner layers” are “disposed on a 
nominally known position relative to the location system.”  (See ’037 patent, Fig. 1, location 
holes 7 and 8.)  Because the  
 was well-known to the public long before Waymo’s LiDAR systems were developed, 
Waymo cannot claim  as a trade secret. 
B. Waymo Is Not Likely to Prevail On Its Patent Claims. 
To establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its patent infringement claims, 
Waymo bears the burden of showing that it will likely prove at trial that the accused devices 
infringe upon the patents.30  Here, because Uber has shown that it does not infringe the ’922 and 
’464 patents, a preliminary injunction should not be granted.  
1. Uber’s Fuji Design Does Not Infringe the ’922 Patent. 
Claim 131 of the’922 patent requires “an optical configuration that uses a common lens to 
both transmit and receive light beams, rather than using separate lenses for transmission and 
receipt.”  (Mot. 16; Kintz Decl. ¶ 65, ECF No. 24-26.)  Waymo characterizes the ’922 patent as 
disclosing a “fundamental single-lens architecture.”  (Mot. 5.)   
Based on the layout of the laser diodes on Fuji’s PCB, Waymo assumes that Fuji must be 
using a common-lens system.  (Kintz Decl. ¶¶ 65-74.)  Waymo is wrong.  In contrast to the ’922 
patent and Waymo’s design, Uber’s Fuji design does not use a single, common lens for both 
the transmit beam and receive beam.  (Haslim Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9.)  Rather, Fuji uses one lens for the 
outbound transmit beam and a separate lens for the inbound receive beam.  (McManamon Decl. 
¶¶ 78-81, 86.)   Because Fuji uses two separate lenses for the transmit and receive beam, it does 
not infringe claim 1 of the ’922 patent.   
Fuji also does not infringe claim 1 because it is missing other limitations required by the 
claim.  For example, claim 1 requires “an interior space that includes . . . a transmit path, and a 
                                                 
29 ’037 patent at 1:52-60. 
30 Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
31 Claim 13 of the ’922 patent depends from claim 1, and Uber’s Fuji design does not infringe 
claim 13 for the same reasons it does not infringe claim 1. 
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receive path.”  Fuji does not have one interior space that contains both the transmit and receive 
path.  Rather, each cavity of Fuji has two compartments—one interior space for the transmit path 
and a separate interior space for the receive path.  (Id. ¶¶ 78-83; Haslim Decl. ¶ 9.)  Further, Fuji 
does not use a “reflective surface” for the receive path – the light received from the lens is 
focused directly onto the receive board.   
2. Uber’s Fuji Design Does Not Infringe the ’464 Patent. 
The ’464 patent is a continuation of the ’922 patent and shares a common specification 
and figures.  Like the ’922 patent, claim 132 of the ’464 patent requires “a common lens for both 
transmit and receive beams” and “an interior space that includes . . . a transmit path, and a receive 
path.”  For the same reasons as stated above, Fuji does not satisfy these limitations and thus does 
not infringe claim 1 of the ’464 patent.  (McManamon Decl. ¶¶ 95-96, 99-100.)   
In addition, claim 1 of the ’464 patent also requires that “the transmit path at least partially 
overlaps the receive path in the interior space between the transmit block and the receive block.”  
The Fuji design, however, contains a separate compartment for the transmit path and the receive 
path.  Thus, the transmit and receive paths never overlap or intersect.  (Id. ¶ 97; Haslim Decl. 
¶ 9.) 
III. WAYMO HAS FAILED TO SHOW IRREPARABLE INJURY. 
Waymo is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy it seeks because it has not and cannot 
demonstrate that without a preliminary injunction it will suffer irreparable harm in the five months 
between the Court’s hearing on its motion and the scheduled trial.  Waymo delayed filing suit for 
roughly that same amount of time, and thus any alleged harm is not immediate. 
The Supreme Court has held “that plaintiffs seeking preliminary relief [must] demonstrate 
that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.”33  To show this, Waymo must 
establish that the threatened injury is immediate, significant, and concrete or non-speculative.34   
                                                 
32 Claim 14 of the ’464 patent depends from claim 1, and Uber’s Fuji design does not infringe 
claim 14 for the same reasons it does not infringe claim 1. 
33 Winter v. Nat. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (emphasis in original). 
34 See Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 2014) (immediate); 
Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (non-speculative); 
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Waymo has not satisfied this heavy burden.  Rather, Waymo relies on:  (1) a presumption 
of irreparable harm that both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have rejected; 
(2) speculative harm about market impact in a currently nonexistent market, in which  
; (3) an 
ambiguous statement in a Nevada DMV filing; and (4) conjectural concerns about public 
disclosure.  Waymo’s arguments do not meet its burden of demonstrating that the allegedly 
threatened injury is likely, immediate, significant, and non-speculative.  And Waymo’s claim of 
irreparable harm is fatally undermined by its lengthy delay in filing for relief almost one year 
after it became suspicious of the alleged conduct by Defendants. 
A. There is No Presumption of Irreparable Harm. 
Waymo broadly proclaims that “continued use of another party’s trade secrets generally 
creates irreparable harm” and that a “similar analysis applies to Defendants’ patent infringement.”  
(Mot. 20–22.)  But the Supreme Court flatly rejected such a presumption in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C.,35 where the Court held that it was error to assume that a permanent 
injunction should issue if patent infringement and validity were shown; instead, the plaintiff must 
satisfy the four-factor test.  This holding has been extended to preliminary injunctions.36   
Following eBay, the Ninth Circuit held that any “presumption of irreparable harm” in 
copyright cases is likewise “dead,”37 and that the presumption is also “foreclose[d]” in trademark 
cases.38  Consistent with this precedent, federal courts within and outside the Ninth Circuit have 
easily rejected the presumption in trade secret cases as well.39  The cases Waymo cites to the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Dep’t of Parks & Recreation v. Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(significant). 
35 547 U.S. 388, 391–94 (2006). 
36 Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2011).   
37 Id. at 995. 
38 Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013). 
39 GSI Tech., Inc. v. United Memories, Inc., No. C 13-1081 PSG, 2013 WL 12172990, at *11 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2013) (“misappropriation of proprietary information alone does not create a 
presumption of irreparable harm”); V’Guara Inc. v. Dec, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1126 (D. Nev. 
2013) (“In light of [Flexible Lifeline], the Court declines to rely on such a presumption” in a 
trade-secret case.); Precision Automation, Inc. v. Tech. Servs., Inc., No. 07-CV-707-AS, 2007 WL 
4480739, at *7 (D. Or. Dec. 14, 2007) (refusing to apply presumption in case involving both trade 
secrets and patents); Kahala Franchising LLC v. Kim, No. CV 13-02933-MWF (FFMx), 
2013 WL 12086126, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2013) (same); Se. X-Ray, Inc. v. Spears, 929 F. 
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contrary are inapposite (Mot. 20), because they either predate the Supreme Court’s decision in 
eBay or predate Flexible Lifeline or rely on precedent that does.40 
B. Waymo Relies Solely on Speculative and Unsupported Harm. 
Waymo contends it will suffer irreparable harm if Uber is allowed to use Waymo’s 
intellectual property to gain a “critical edge” in the race “to become the first to offer a full suite of 
commercial self-driving services.” (Mot. 20–21.)  But there is no evidence that Uber has 
commercialized this technology, or even that  
.  Waymo merely speculates that this may happen.  Such 
speculative injury is precisely the type of irreparable harm that this Circuit has flatly rejected as a 
basis for granting provisional relief.41   
Harm not imminent.  Contrary to Waymo’s assertions that Uber’s “deploy[ment]” of its 
LiDAR technology in a “product launch” is “imminent” (Mot. 12),  
.  (Haslim 
Decl. ¶ 22.)  To date, Uber has never installed a LiDAR of its own design on a vehicle; instead, it 
uses commercially available technology from third parties, such as Velodyne, in all of its cars that 
are currently on the road.  (Id. ¶ 21.)  There simply is no risk that  
   
To support its claim of immediate harm, Waymo relies only on a September 2016 Nevada 
DMV filing,42 in which Otto stated that it had “developed in-house and/or currently deployed” a 
custom LiDAR system.  Otto trucks deployed in Nevada, however, did not have any LiDAR on 
them at all, much less LiDAR developed in-house, as shown by pictures taken of an Otto truck 
                                                                                                                                                              
Supp. 2d 867, 872 (W.D. Ark. 2013) (applying four-factor analysis to trade-secret claims, 
“making no presumptions as to irreparable harm.”). 
40 Pixon Imaging, Inc. v. Empower Techs. Corp., No. 11-CV-1093-JM (MDD), 2011 WL 
3739529, at *6 n.7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011), relies on precedent that predates eBay and 
was issued only two days after Flexible Lifeline.  The other, Advanced Instructional Systems, Inc. 
v. Competentum USA, Ltd., No. 1:15CV858, 2015 WL 7575925, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 25, 2015), 
fails to cite eBay altogether, instead relying on two district court cases from the 1990s. 
41 In re Excel Innovations, Inc., 502 F.3d 1086, 1098 (9th Cir. 2007). 
42 The language was imprecise and ambiguous given the term “and/or.”  Uber subsequently 
clarified this regulatory filing, explaining that “Otto has been developing its own LiDAR systems, 
but has not yet deployed an ‘[i]n-house custom built 64-laser’ in its autonomous vehicles.”  
(Chang Decl. Ex. 8.) (emphasis added).   
Case 3:17-cv-00939-WHA   Document 177   Filed 04/07/17   Page 25 of 32
 DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Case No. 3:17-cv-00939-WHA 20
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
during its test runs.  The cases in Waymo’s motion can be distinguished on this basis—they 
involved well-established markets.43  (Mot. 21.)  Accordingly, Waymo cannot establish 
irreparable harm based on an unfounded concern over imminent commercialization.44   
No threat of disclosure of Waymo’s trade secrets.  Waymo also argues that it will suffer 
irreparable harm because the absence of an injunction will “result in further disclosure” of its 
trade secrets.  (Mot. 21.) (emphasis in original)  This also is unsupported speculation.  First, 
without any citation to evidence, Waymo claims that “Defendants have already begun making 
regulatory filings that reference Waymo’s trade secrets.”  (Mot. 21.)  That is false.  To the extent 
Waymo is relying on the September 2016 Nevada DMV filing, that filing does not disclose any 
trade secrets, as it is publicly known that  
.  (E.g., Droz Dep. 19:3-11  
  Waymo’s claim that unspecified future regulatory 
filings will contain Waymo’s trade secrets is the hallmark of speculation without evidence.  
Second, Waymo asserts that Defendants’ so-called “disrespectful” behavior leaves “little doubt 
that Defendants would not hesitate to throw Waymo’s trade secrets open to the general public” 
should it suit them.  (Mot. 21.)  This is attorney argument and nothing more.45  
Money damages are adequate.  Finally, Waymo does not argue that money damages are 
inadequate to compensate it for any injury.46  Indeed, “[e]conomic damages are not traditionally 
considered irreparable because the injury can later be remedied by a damage award.”47  Waymo 
makes no attempt to explain why money damages would be inadequate to remedy any 
competitive injury.  And courts have held that a decrease in market share and profits, such as that 
                                                 
43 Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1991), involved the 
French-fries market and Netlist Inc. v. Diablo Techs. Inc, No. 13-CV-05962-YGR, 2015 WL 
153724 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2015), involved computer-server memory market. 
44 Zodiac Pool Sys., Inc. v. Aquastar Pool Prods., Inc., No. 13cv343-GPC (WMC), 2013 WL 
690616, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013) (holding no irreparable harm where product will not be 
sold imminently). 
45 Tellingly, Waymo never even attempts to argue that it could win a preliminary injunction 
based on threatened, rather than actual, misappropriation.  
46 Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that where 
monetary damages can compensate plaintiff, preliminary injunction is not justified). 
47 Delphon Indus. LLC v. Int’l Test Sols., Inc. No. 11-CV-1338-PSG, 2011 WL 4915792, at 
*3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2011).   
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which Waymo fears, can be compensated monetarily.48   
C. Waymo’s Delay in Filing This Action Refutes the Alleged Irreparable Harm. 
Waymo’s claim of irreparable harm is fatally undermined by its delay in filing for relief.  
A “long delay before seeking a preliminary injunction implies a lack of urgency and irreparable 
harm.”49  An unreasonable delay can be a matter of months.50  Indeed, in multiple cases, Google 
itself has argued that even a four or five-month delay undermines a claim of irreparable harm.51   
In this inquiry, the proper focus is on the point in time when plaintiff was “aware, or 
should have been aware” of the alleged wrongdoing.52  When a plaintiff suspects wrongdoing, the 
clock has already started ticking.53  Here, that clock began to tick a year ago, if not earlier.  
Waymo’s 
  (Chang Decl. Ex. 5, Brown Dep. 11:2–4, 11:20–12:8.)   
 
 
  (Chang Decl. Ex. 5, Brown Dep. 47:23–49:4; Brown Decl. ¶ 22, ECF No. 24-2.)  By 
August 2016, the departure of certain engineers had raised additional “suspicion[],” (Mot. 9), and 
Uber’s acquisition of Mr. Levandowski’s startup allegedly caused “grave concern.”  (Compl. 
¶ 57, ECF No. 1.)  By no later than October 2016—five months before Waymo filed its motion—
Waymo claims  
  
(Chang Decl. Ex. 5, Brown Dep. 31:21–32:21.)  The same month, Waymo filed claims against 
                                                 
48 Hologic, Inc. v. Senorx, Inc., No. C-08-00133 RMW, 2008 WL 1860035, at *16–17 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 25, 2008). 
49 Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985).   
50 Larsen v. City of San Carlos, No. 14-CV-04731-JD, 2014 WL 5473515, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 28, 2014) (three months)); Hiramanek v. Clark, No. C-13-0228 EMC, 2013 WL 5082640, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2013) (one month). 
51 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google Inc., Google’s Opposition to Perfect 10’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, 2005 WL 4705034, at *23 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005); see also Garcia v. Google, Inc., 
786 F.3d 733, 746 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Hanginout, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 
1109, 1132–33 (S.D. Cal. 2014). 
52 Kwan Software Eng’g, Inc. v. Foray Techs., LLC, No. C 12-03762 SI, 2013 WL 244999, 
at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2013), aff’d, 551 F. App’x 298 (9th Cir. 2013). 
53 See Blackmon v. Tobias, No. C 11-2853 SBA, 2011 WL 2445963, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 
June 16, 2011). 
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Mr. Levandowski in arbitration.  (Gonzalez Decl. ISO Mot. to Compel Arbitration, Ex. 1, ECF 
No. 114-7.)  Thus, the existence of the downloading Waymo alleges cannot be the basis for 
seeking emergency relief.  Waymo waited five months after learning of that downloading before 
seeking relief.   
Waymo attempts to gloss over its delay by emphasizing a December 2016 email that 
allegedly contained “proof” of misappropriation and infringement in the form of images of a 
single Uber LiDAR circuit board.  (Mot. 10.)  But this email does not materially change what 
Waymo already concluded:  Mr. Levandowski had allegedly exported files to a personal device 
that was not issued by Waymo, and he went to work for a competitor.  Moreover, the December 
2016 email does not show that any alleged harm to Waymo is in any way “immediate.”  It merely 
shows that Uber is working on a LiDAR system that Waymo (incorrectly) believes is similar to 
its LiDAR.  That fact is vigorously disputed, but there is no dispute that Waymo has presented 
zero evidence that Uber is about to deploy an in-house-developed LiDAR system in the 
immediate future.54 
IV. THE BALANCE OF HARDSHIPS STRONGLY DISFAVORS AN INJUNCTION. 
Even when a party, unlike Waymo here, has demonstrated likelihood of success of the 
merits, this Court has held that the “party must also show that the balance of hardships tip sharply 
in its favor in order to prevail on its motion for a preliminary injunction.”55  Where, as here, 
Waymo has neither shown likelihood of success on the merits nor irreparable harm, the burden is 
even greater.  Waymo has not met this burden. 
Just as there is no presumption of irreparable harm, there is also no presumption of 
hardship simply because this is a case concerning intellectual property.56  As discussed above, 
there is no cognizable irreparable harm that Waymo would experience between now and the date 
                                                 
54 Waymo also points again to the September 2016 Nevada DMV filing.  (Compl. ¶ 61.)  The 
assertion that this generic and equivocal regulatory filing somehow constituted the “final piece of 
the puzzle” is simply implausible. 
55 Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
(Alsup, J.).   
56 Mitigation Techs., Inc. v. Pennartz, No. ED CV 14-01954-AB (SPx), 2015 WL 12656936, 
at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2015); Leatt Corp. v. Innovative Safety Tech., LLC, No. 09-CV-1301-
IEG (POR), 2010 WL 1526382, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2010). 
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of trial that an injunction would forestall.  Contrary to Waymo’s contention, it would not be 
“forced ‘to compete against its own patented invention,’” (Mot. 24), because  
  
(Haslim Decl. ¶ 22.).   
On the other hand, the burden in the intervening months on Uber would be substantial.  
First, Waymo overreaches in the scope of its requested injunction.  As this Court noted twice in 
recent hearings, in the more than one hundred alleged “trade secrets” that Waymo seeks to enjoin 
Defendants from using (along with “any colorable variation”), Waymo overreaches and attempts 
to claim trade secret protection over clearly unprotectable material, such as commonplace 
knowledge about vendors and suppliers, techniques that are dictated by physics, and information 
disclosed in the prior art.  By effectively prohibiting Defendants from using such technology and 
techniques, the injunction should would unfairly undermine and burden Defendants’ independent 
LiDAR development, which was built without any of Waymo’s trade secrets, and on which Uber 
has spent thousands of man-hours.  (Haslim Decl. ¶ 20.)  It would also limit the work of about 25 
employees.  (Haslim Decl. ¶ 5.)  Waymo admits that this outcome would be improper:  “Waymo 
is not seeking to enjoin Defendants from pursuing self-driving car projects in toto.”  (Mot. 23.) 
For example, one of the “trade secrets” that Waymo seeks to enjoin Uber from using is the 
  
(Jaffe Decl. Ex. 1, ¶ 93, ECF No. 25-7.)  This Court has already noted that Waymo’s argument 
that   (CMC Hr’g Tr. 7, Mar. 29, 2017, ECF No. 131 
(“[S]ome of the things in your motion are bogus.  You’ve got things in there like  
as trade secrets.  Come on.  It undermines the whole thing.”).  In other words, the injunction that 
Waymo seeks could theoretically prevent Uber from even  
 
 
  (Chang Decl. 
Ex. 4, Willis Dep. 87:22–88:12.)  Barring such contact would be potentially devastating to Uber’s 
legitimate efforts to compete, and flies in the face of the requirement that any injunction must be 
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“no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs” 
and “tailored to remedy the specific harm alleged.”57   
Second, Waymo incorrectly assumes that Uber could easily continue developing 
self-driving cars by acquiring LiDAR technology from third-party vendors.  Existing vendors of 
LiDAR technology cannot keep up with demand for the quantities needed for testing, much less 
for commercial use.  (Boehmke Decl. ¶¶ 11, 15, 16.)  In fact, the impetus for Defendants to 
develop an in-house customized LiDAR was, in part, due to the difficulty in obtaining LiDAR 
sensors in sufficient quantities from commercial sources.  , Uber’s primary supplier for 
the cars currently on the road, cannot meet the demand for its LiDARs.  (Haslim Decl. ¶ 21.)  The 
fact that there is “no readily available substitute” also tilts the balance of hardships in Defendants’ 
favor.58   
V. THE PUBLIC INTEREST DISFAVORS AN INJUNCTION 
Waymo acknowledges—as it must—that the public has a strong interest in promoting 
“competition and consumer choice” in the development and creation of a self-driving car 
marketplace.  (Mot. 25.)  As this Court has held, the best way to promote that public interest is by 
encouraging fair and vigorous competition in the use of ideas in this developing industry.59   
Uber has been a visionary and a pioneer in the transportation industry, essentially creating 
the concept of ride-sharing, offering economic opportunities for hundreds of thousands of drivers, 
and pioneering other innovative solutions in transportation.  In that vein, Uber is competing 
vigorously but fairly to eliminate the number one cause of car accidents—human error.  
Especially where there is no risk of an imminent commercialization or deployment of the 
disputed technology, the public interest weighs against any injunction. 
The only public interest that Waymo argues would be furthered by a preliminary 
                                                 
57 McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2012). 
58 Advanced Rotorcraft Tech., Inc. v. L-3 Commc’ns Corp., No. C 06-06470 WHA, 2007 WL 
437682, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2007). 
59 Yamashita v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., No. C 06-01690 WHA, 2006 WL 1320470, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 
May 15, 2006); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969) (“[T]he equities of the licensor do 
not weigh very heavily when they are balanced against the important public interest in permitting 
full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain.”). 
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injunction is “vindicating both trade secret and patent rights.”  (Mot. 24.)  But Uber has not 
impinged on Waymo’s trade secret and patent rights.  Rather, Uber developed—and continues to 
develop—its own technology without the use of any of Waymo’s trade secrets and without 
infringing Waymo’s patents.  (Supra at 3:23-6:28; 8:11-15:4.)  Moreover, many of Waymo’s 
claimed “trade secrets” are known in the prior art, have been publicly disclosed, or are dictated by 
the laws of physics.60  The public’s interest is not served by an injunction preventing infringement 
that Waymo “has not shown has [occurred] or is likely to occur.”61 
Moreover, as this Court has held, while there exists a public interest in protecting rights 
secured by valid patents, the public interest may be better served by purchasers “having access to 
competitive products, being able to determine which products better suit their needs, and 
receiving reduced prices due to the availability of competing products.”62  This is especially true 
here, where the overreaching scope of Waymo’s requested injunction would severely slow 
development of a competing LiDAR system, as it would even capture activity that builds on 
public material and prior art.  (Supra at 10:25-11:10; 12:3-11; 14:6-18; 15:5-16:4; 23:3-24:9.) 
Finally, California has a strong public policy in favor of employee mobility and free 
competition.63  This is particularly important where talent and ingenuity is the primary resource 
that drives competition in the creation of a new industry.  Waymo has presented no evidence that 
Mr. Levandowski—or anyone else at Uber—ever used the allegedly downloaded files.  In the 
absence of such evidence, Waymo must argue that its technology for building autonomous cars 
might somehow be inevitably disclosed to Uber by virtue of talented individuals going to work 
there.  But California has definitively rejected the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine.64   
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Waymo’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction should be denied. 
                                                 
60 See declarations of Paul McManamon and Michael Lebby. 
61 Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 2014 WL 492364, at *11. 
62 Yamashita, 2006 WL 1320470, at *8.   
63 Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal. 4th 937, 946 (2008); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
§§ 16600-16601 (recognizing California’s “settled legislative policy in favor of open competition 
and employee mobility”). 
64 Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1463 (2002) (“Lest there be any doubt 
about our holding, our rejection of the inevitable disclosure doctrine is complete.”). 
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Dated:  April 7, 2017 
 
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 
By:   /s/ Arturo J. González 
ARTURO J. GONZÁLEZ 
Attorneys for Defendants  
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,  
OTTOMOTTO LLC, and OTTO TRUCKING LLC
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I, Rhian Morgan, declare as follows:   
1. I have been an employee of Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) since August 24, 
2016, and prior to that I served as HR Lead at Ottomotto LLC (“Otto”).  I make this declaration in 
support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and have 
personal knowledge of the facts stated herein. 
2. Prior to Otto, I had worked in human resources, recruitment, and staffing for 
almost six years.  From May 2015 to January 2016, I worked as a Mobile Delivery Specialist at 
consultative technology staffing firm K2 Partnering Solutions.  From May 2011 to May 2015, I 
worked in HR and as a recruiter at ID Business Solutions. 
3. I starting working at Otto in approximately January 2016.  At that time, I was 
involved in matters related to payroll, benefits, and office space set up.   
4. I was the first employee at Otto.  In my role as HR Lead, I have been responsible 
for all aspects of human resources at Otto, including recruitment, hiring, on-boarding of new 
employees, and implementing Otto’s related company policies.  As part of my responsibilities, I 
also maintain employee personnel files, including the forms that document recruiting and hiring 
processes at Otto. 
5. Since the formation of the company, Otto has taken measures against an 
employee’s retention of confidential information from a former employer starting from the offer 
process.  The offer letter provided by Otto explicitly prohibits an offeree from bringing any 
confidential information from his or her former employer:  
Company does not want you to, and hereby directs that you must 
not, bring to Company, or otherwise use in connection with 
performing any services on behalf of the Company, any intellectual 
property rights or other proprietary or confidential material or 
information of any former employer or other third party. 
6. The offer letter requires an offeree to represent and warrant that he or she will not 
bring any confidential information from his or her former employer to Otto: 
Accordingly, by signing this Offer Letter you represent and warrant 
that you will not bring to Company, or otherwise use in connection 
with performing any services on behalf of the Company, any 
intellectual property rights or other proprietary or confidential 
material or information of any former employer or other party. 
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7. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of an exemplar offer letter from 
Otto.   
8. I am aware that, since the formation of the company in January 2016, Otto has 
made slight modifications to its offer letter.  I have reviewed each version of the offer letter 
template, and each version contains the same language quoted above.   
9. During the onboarding process for Otto, it was my normal business practice to 
provide an oral overview of the contents of the offer letter—including the prohibition against and 
representation and warranty regarding former employer information—with each new hire. 
10. In the same period as signing the offer letter, a new Otto employee was also 
required to complete and execute an Employee Invention Assignment and Confidentiality 
Agreement (“EIACA”).  Each Otto employee made the following representations in his or her 
EIACA: 
I represent that my performance of all the terms of this Agreement 
and my duties as an employee of the Company will not breach any 
invention assignment, proprietary information, confidentiality, non-
competition, or other agreement with any former employer or other 
party. I represent that I will not bring with me to the Company or 
use in the performance of my duties for the Company any 
documents or materials or intangibles of my own or of a former 
employer or third party that are not generally available for use by 
the public or have not been legally transferred to the Company. 
11. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of an exemplar EIACA from Otto.   
12. During the onboarding process for Otto, it was my normal business practice to 
provide an oral overview of the contents of the EIACA—including the representations that the 
employee has not breached any of his or her agreements with any former employer—with each 
new hire. 
13. In approximately April 2016, Otto undertook the additional measure against 
breach of former employment agreements by issuing an employee attestation where each 
employee certified and declaration that he or she had not committed any of the following acts: 
 fraud in connection with me becoming employed by 
Ottomotto; 
 willful, intentional or deliberate conduct that constitutes or 
directly leads or contributes to the infringement (direct or 
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indirect) or misappropriation of any patents, copyrights, 
trademarks or trade secrets of my prior employer including, 
without limitation, taking removing and/or copying 
software, product plans, or invention disclosures, in 
electronic or tangible form that are owned by my prior 
employer; 
 willful and/or intentional breach by me of any fiduciary duty 
or duty of loyalty to my prior employer; and/or 
 willful and/or intentional breach by me of any lawful and 
enforceable non-solicitation, non-competition, 
confidentiality or other similarly restrictive covenant or 
agreement between me and my prior employer. 
 
14. Attached as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of an exemplar attestation. 
15. I supervised the distribution and return of these executed attestations in 
approximately April 2016.  Each employee who worked at Otto at that time executed an 
attestation. 
16. Subsequent new hires executed the attestation during the onboarding process for 
Otto.  It was my normal business practice to provide an oral overview of the contents of the 
attestation—including the representations that the employee has not breached any of his or her 
agreements with any former employer—with each new hire. 
17. Otto also provided instruction to employees regarding how to respond to outreach 
by candidates from their former employers to whom they had non-solicitation obligations.  I am 
aware that certain Otto employees who had management roles with their previous employers, 
including Anthony Levandowski, received such instruction.  If such a communication was 
received, Otto employees were to indicate they are screening themselves from the recruiting 
process with that candidate and that the candidate can apply for employment at Otto by contacting 
me. 
18. As part of that screening from the recruiting process, it was Otto’s company policy 
that individuals could not conduct interviews of any candidate from their former employers.   
19. In my role as HR Lead, I oversaw the recruiting process and managed other 
recruiters employed at Otto.  It was my normal business practice to repeatedly instruct all 
recruiters at Otto that they were prohibited from reaching out to any current Google employee. 
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I, David Meall, declare as follows:   
1. I have been an employee of Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”) since November 4, 
2013.  I make this declaration in support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for a 
Preliminary Injunction and have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein. 
2. Prior to Uber, I had worked in human resources, engagement, and talent 
development for over 10 years.  From September 2009 to October 2013, I worked as the Principal 
Technical Recruiter for Talent Pulse.  During that time, I also worked as a Recruiting Consultant 
for Scopely (from September 2012 to June 2013), Hulu (from February 2012 to September 2012), 
and Microsoft (from February 2011 to February 2012).  From February 2007 to September 2009, 
I worked as a Senior Technical Recruiter for iMatch Technical Services.   
3. When I first joined Uber in November 2013, I worked as a Technical Recruiter for 
Uber.  Over the next three years, I was promoted to Senior Technical Recruiting Lead, then 
Recruiting Manager, then Senior Recruiting Manager. 
4. In approximately July 2016, I became the Senior Recruiting Manager supporting 
Uber’s Advanced Technologies Group (ATG) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  Since then, I have 
been responsible for the aspects of human resources at ATG related to recruitment, hiring, and 
on-boarding of new employees, and implementing ATG’s related company policies.  As part of 
my responsibilities, I also have access to employee personnel files, including the forms that 
document recruiting and hiring processes at ATG. 
5. All employees working in ATG are employees of Uber, and ATG applies the same 
Uber measures against an employee’s retention of confidential information from a former 
employer starting from the offer process.  The offer letter requires an offeree to represent and 
warrant that he or she will not bring any confidential information from his or her former employer 
to Uber: 
You represent and warrant to the Company that you are under no 
obligations or commitments, whether contractual or otherwise, that 
are inconsistent with your obligations under this Agreement.  In 
connection with your Employment, you shall not use or disclose 
any trade secrets or other proprietary information or intellectual 
property in which you or any other person has any right, title or 
interest and your Employment will not infringe or violate the rights 
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Uber Technologies, Inc. 
1455 Market Street, 4th Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94103 
 
Date 
Name 
 
RE:  EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
Dear FirstName, 
 
On behalf of Uber Technologies, Inc., a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), I am pleased to offer 
you the position of Title.  Your employment by the Company shall be governed by the following 
terms and conditions (this “Agreement”): 
1. Duties and Scope of Employment. 
a. Position.  For the term of your employment under this Agreement (your “Employment”), the 
Company agrees to employ you in the position of Title or in such other position as the 
Company subsequently may assign to you.  You will report to SupervisorsFullName, or to 
such other person as the Company subsequently may determine.  You will be working out of 
the Company’s office in Pittsburgh.  You will perform the duties and have the responsibilities 
and authority customarily performed and held by an employee in your position or as 
otherwise may be assigned or delegated to you by your supervisor. 
b. Obligations to the Company.  During your Employment, you shall devote your full business 
efforts and time to the Company. During your Employment, without express written 
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permission from the Chief Executive Officer or one of his direct reports, you shall not render 
services in any capacity to any other person or entity and shall not act as a sole proprietor or 
partner of any other person or entity or own more than five percent of the stock of any other 
corporation.  Notwithstanding the foregoing, you may serve on corporate, civic or charitable 
boards or committees, deliver lectures, fulfill speaking engagements, teach at educational 
institutions, or manage personal investments without such advance written consent, provided 
that such activities do not individually or in the aggregate interfere with the performance of 
your duties under this Agreement.  You shall comply with the Company’s policies and rules, 
as they may be in effect from time to time during your Employment. 
c. No Conflicting Obligations.  You represent and warrant to the Company that you are under 
no obligations or commitments, whether contractual or otherwise, that are inconsistent with 
your obligations under this Agreement.  In connection with your Employment, you shall not 
use or disclose any trade secrets or other proprietary information or intellectual property in 
which you or any other person has any right, title or interest and your Employment will not 
infringe or violate the rights of any other person.  You represent and warrant to the Company 
that you have returned all property and confidential information belonging to any prior 
employer. 
d. Commencement Date.  You shall commence full-time Employment as soon as reasonably 
practicable and in no event later than StartDate. 
2. Cash and Incentive Compensation. 
a. Salary.  The Company shall pay you as compensation for your services an initial base 
salary at a gross annual rate of $Salary.  Such salary shall be payable in accordance with 
the Company’s standard payroll procedures.  
b. Performance Bonus. As an Uber employee, you will be eligible to participate in Uber’s 
annual performance bonus program, with your first bonus award (if any) prorated based 
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on your start date at Uber.  Uber has a pay for performance culture and we compensate 
our top performers accordingly.  Uber is a dynamic place and bonus awards under the 
bonus program may vary year to year based on a number of factors including company 
performance and manager discretion.  For context, last year the target bonus value was 
$XX for an individual in a comparable role/level and payout multiples were applied to 
reward high performance.  For example, the top 15% of bonus-eligible employees 
received 3.5x or more of target.  Please note that these figures reflect historical values 
and the bonus program is subject to change year over year.  It is unlikely that any given 
person would receive the exact amounts shown above.  Bonus amounts were delivered 
mostly in equity, vesting over three years.  Uber does not guarantee that you will receive 
a bonus - the lowest 20% of performers should not expect to receive an award, and all 
awards are at the discretion of the Company. 
c. Expense Reimbursement.  Additionally, in order to assist you to move yourself and your 
household to Pittsburgh, Uber will reimburse you up to an amount that will not exceed 
$XXXX to cover your actual relocation expenses (“Relocation Payment”) incurred for the 
following items (if applicable): 
• Packing, crating, moving and transporting your household goods and personal effects 
from your former home to your new home 
• Storing and insuring household goods and personal effects 
• Shipping your car and household pets to your new home 
• Connecting or disconnecting utilities 
• Transportation from your current home to Pittsburgh 
• Other eligible expenses per Uber’s global mobility guidelines 
The relocation reimbursement payment shall be made to you net of all applicable withholding 
taxes and other applicable deductions in accordance with Uber’s standard payroll practices. In 
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addition to the above, Uber ATG will pay for four (4) weeks temporary housing to assist with 
your relocation to Pittsburgh, PA. 
d. Restricted Stock Units.  As soon as reasonably practicable after the date you commence 
full-time Employment, and subject to the approval of the Company’s Board of Directors 
(the “Board”), the Company shall grant you RSUs restricted stock units (“RSUs”) with 
respect to shares of the Company’s Common Stock.  The RSUs will be subject to both a 
time-based and a performance-based vesting condition as well as to other terms and 
conditions set forth in the Company’s 2013 Stock Plan (the “Stock Plan”) and in the 
Company's standard form of RSU Agreement.  For further information about the vesting 
conditions applicable to the RSUs, please see the RSU Vesting Summary (attached hereto 
as Attachment C).  
3. Vacation/PTO and Employee Benefits.  During your Employment, you shall be eligible for paid 
vacation / paid time off, in accordance with the Company’s vacation / paid time off policy, as it 
may be amended from time to time.  During your Employment, you shall be eligible to 
participate in the employee benefit plans maintained by the Company and generally available to 
similarly situated employees of the Company, subject in each case to the generally applicable 
terms and conditions of the plan in question and to the determinations of any person or 
committee administering such plan. 
4. Business Expenses.  The Company will reimburse you for your necessary and reasonable business 
expenses incurred in connection with your duties hereunder upon presentation of an itemized 
account and appropriate supporting documentation, all in accordance with the Company’s 
generally applicable policies. 
5. Termination. 
a. Employment at Will.  Your Employment shall be “at will,” meaning that either you or the 
Company shall be entitled to terminate your Employment at any time and for any reason, 
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with or without Cause.  Any contrary representations that may have been made to you 
shall be superseded by this Agreement.  This Agreement shall constitute the full and 
complete agreement between you and the Company on the “at-will” nature of your 
Employment, which may only be changed in an express written agreement signed by you 
(or your authorized representative) and a duly authorized officer of the Company. 
b. Rights Upon Termination.  Except as expressly provided herein, upon the termination of 
your Employment, you shall only be entitled to the compensation and benefits earned 
and the reimbursements described in this Agreement for the period preceding the 
effective date of the termination. 
6. Pre-Employment Conditions. 
a. Confidentiality Agreement.  Your acceptance of this offer and commencement of 
employment with the Company is contingent upon the execution, and delivery to an 
officer of the Company, of the Company’s Confidential Information and Invention 
Assignment Agreement, a copy of which is enclosed for your review and execution (the 
“Confidentiality Agreement”), prior to or on your Start Date. 
b. Right to Work.  For purposes of federal immigration law, you will be required to provide 
to the Company documentary evidence of your identity and eligibility for employment in 
the United States.  Such documentation must be provided to us within three (3) business 
days of your Start Date, or our employment relationship with you may be terminated.  
This offer may be rescinded if you are unable to begin work at Uber within a reasonable 
amount of time due to work eligibility issues or export control licensure requirements. 
c. Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement. Your acceptance of this offer and 
commencement of employment with the Company is contingent upon the execution, and 
delivery to an officer of the Company, of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement, a 
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copy of which is enclosed as Attachment B for your review and execution, prior to or on 
your Start Date. 
7. Compliance 
a. Restricted Parties Lists Verification. This offer of employment and/or your continued 
employment with the Company is contingent upon verification that you and, if applicable, 
your affiliated entity/institution do not appear on any of the Restricted Parties Lists 
maintained by the U.S. Government that will prevent the Company from transacting (including 
but not limited to financial transactions) or engaging in certain type of activities with you, 
directly or indirectly. 
b. Foreign National Employee - Export License Determination. If an export control license is 
required in connection with your employment, this offer is further contingent upon receipt of 
the necessary export license and any similar government approvals by the Company’s office 
where you are based. Your employment with the Company will commence following receipt 
of such export license and governmental approvals; and is conditioned upon your (a) 
maintaining your employment with the Company, and (b) continued compliance with all 
conditions and limitations imposed by such license. If for any reason such export license and 
governmental approvals cannot be obtained within a commercially reasonable time from your 
date of signature, this offer will automatically terminate and have no force and effect. 
Additionally, should an export license become necessary at any point following the 
commencement of your employment with the Company, no export-controlled information or 
materials will be released to you until such license and any similar government approvals are 
obtained. The Company is not obligated to apply for any export license or other government 
approval that may be required in connection with your employment, and the Company 
cannot guarantee that any such license or similar approvals will be granted, if sought. 
8. Successors. 
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a. Company’s Successors.  This Agreement shall be binding upon any successor (whether 
direct or indirect and whether by purchase, lease, merger, consolidation, liquidation or 
otherwise) to all or substantially all of the Company’s business and/or assets.  For all 
purposes under this Agreement, the term “Company” shall include any successor to the 
Company’s business or assets that becomes bound by this Agreement. 
b. Your Successors.  This Agreement and all of your rights hereunder shall inure to the 
benefit of, and be enforceable by, your personal or legal representatives, executors, 
administrators, successors, heirs, distributees, devisees and legatees. 
9. Miscellaneous Provisions. 
a. Notice.  Notices and all other communications contemplated by this Agreement shall be 
in writing and shall be deemed to have been duly given when personally delivered or 
when mailed by U.S. registered or certified mail, return receipt requested and postage 
prepaid.  In your case, mailed notices shall be addressed to you at the home address that 
you most recently communicated to the Company in writing.  In the case of the Company, 
mailed notices shall be addressed to its corporate headquarters, and all notices shall be 
directed to the attention of its Secretary. 
b. Modifications and Waivers.  No provision of this Agreement shall be modified, waived 
or discharged unless the modification, waiver or discharge is agreed to in writing and 
signed by you and by an authorized officer of the Company (other than you).  No waiver 
by either party of any breach of, or of compliance with, any condition or provision of this 
Agreement by the other party shall be considered a waiver of any other condition or 
provision or of the same condition or provision at another time. 
c. Whole Agreement.  No other agreements, representations or understandings (whether 
oral or written and whether express or implied) which are not expressly set forth in this 
Agreement have been made or entered into by either party with respect to the subject 
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matter hereof.  This Agreement, the Restricted Stock Units Agreement, the Confidentiality 
Agreement, and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement contain the entire 
understanding of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof. 
d. Withholding Taxes.  All payments made under this Agreement shall be subject to 
reduction to reflect taxes or other charges required to be withheld by law. 
e. Choice of Law and Severability.  This Paragraph 9(e) (“Choice of Law and Severability”) 
does not apply to Paragraph 9(f) (“Arbitration”) or to the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Agreement contained in Attachment B to this Agreement, and to the extent that this 
Paragraph 9(e) conflicts with Paragraph 9(f) or the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Agreement, the provisions contained in Paragraph 9(f) and the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Agreement control. Subject to the preceding sentence, this Agreement 
otherwise shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State in which you 
work/last worked without giving effect to provisions governing the choice of law, and if 
any provision of this Agreement becomes or is deemed invalid, illegal or unenforceable in 
any applicable jurisdiction by reason of the scope, extent or duration of its coverage, then 
such provision shall be deemed amended to the minimum extent necessary to conform 
to applicable law so as to be valid and enforceable or, if such provision cannot be so 
amended without materially altering the intention of the parties, then such provision shall 
be stricken and the remainder of this Agreement shall continue in full force and effect. If 
any provision of this Agreement is rendered illegal by any present or future statute, law, 
ordinance or regulation (collectively, the “Law”) then that provision shall be curtailed or 
limited only to the minimum extent necessary to bring the provision into compliance with 
the Law. All the other terms and provisions of this Agreement shall continue in full force 
and effect without impairment or limitation. 
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f. Arbitration.  Attachment B to this Agreement is an Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Agreement. This Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement is governed by the Federal 
Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) and is incorporated by reference into and is part of 
this offer of employment. Therefore, before accepting this offer of employment, please 
read the Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement carefully. 
g. No Assignment.  This Agreement and all of your rights and obligations hereunder are 
personal to you and may not be transferred or assigned by you at any time.  The 
Company may assign its rights under this Agreement to any entity that assumes the 
Company’s obligations hereunder in connection with any sale or transfer of all or a 
substantial portion of the Company’s assets to such entity. 
h. Counterparts.  This Agreement may be executed in two or more counterparts, each of 
which shall be deemed an original, but all of which together shall constitute one and the 
same instrument. 
[Signature Page Follows] 
 
  
Case 3:17-cv-00939-WHA   Document 177-3   Filed 04/07/17   Page 10 of 12
  
10 
We are all delighted to be able to extend you this offer and look forward to working with you.  
Please understand that this offer is contingent upon successful completion of your background check 
investigation.  To indicate your acceptance of the Company’s offer, please sign and date this letter in 
the space provided below and return it to me, along with a signed and dated original copy of the 
Confidentiality Agreement and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement.  The Company requests 
that you begin work in this new position on or before StartDate. This offer must be accepted on or 
before ExpirationDate.  Please indicate the date (either on or before the aforementioned date) on 
which you expect to begin work in the space provided below (the “Start Date”). 
Very truly yours, 
Uber Technologies, Inc. 
By:  
Name: Anthony Levandowski 
Title: Vice President, Engineering 
ACCEPTED AND AGREED: 
Candidate Name 
Candidate Signature 
  
 
  
Date 
Anticipated Start Date: 
Attachment A:  Confidential Information and Invention Assignment Agreement 
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Attachment B:  Alternative Dispute Resolution Agreement 
Attachment C:  RSU Vesting Summary 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 
WAYMO LLC, 
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v. 
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,  
OTTOMOTTO LLC; OTTO TRUCKING LLC, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 3:17-cv-00939-WHA 
DECLARATION OF ASHEEM 
LINAVAL IN SUPPORT OF 
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PLAINTIFF WAYMO LLC’S 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
Date: May 3, 2017 
Time: 7:30 a.m. 
Ctrm: 8, 19th Floor 
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Trial Date:  October 2, 2017 
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I, Asheem Linaval, declare as follows: 
1. I am a hardware engineer at Uber Technologies, Inc. (“Uber”).  I make this 
declaration in support of Uber’s opposition to plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.  I 
make this declaration based on personal knowledge and, if called as a witness, I would testify to 
the facts listed below. 
2. I work on electronics design and am responsible for circuit board designs at Uber.  
I previously worked as an electrical engineer at OttoMotto LLC.  Prior to joining Otto, I was an 
Operations Associate working on Chauffeur for Adecco, which was a Google staffing agency.  I 
have worked on electronics design and hardware implementation for approximately seven years  
3. I signed an offer letter when I joined 280 Systems, Inc., which became OttoMotto.  
The letter included provisions regarding third-party intellectual property (“IP”) and confidential 
information, instructing employees not to bring with them and use the IP and/or confidential 
information of any other companies.  My offer letter provided that “Company does not want you 
to, and hereby directs that you must not, bring to Company, or otherwise use in connection with 
performing any services on behalf of the Company, any intellectual property rights or other 
proprietary or confidential material or information of any former employer or other third 
party.  Accordingly by signing this Offer Letter you represent and warrant that you will not bring 
to Company, or otherwise use in connection with performing any services on behalf of the 
Company, any intellectual property rights or other proprietary or confidential material or 
information of any former employer or other party.”  Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct 
copy of my signed offer letter. 
4. I regularly use Altium, which is software for designing circuit boards, and am 
familiar with the software package and the files it generates.  I have used Altium for 
approximately six years. 
5. I also regularly use LTspice, which is a software simulation tool for circuitry, and 
am familiar with the software package and the files it generates.  I have used LT Spice for 
approximately seven years.  
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6. I also regularly use SolidWorks, which is software used for mechanical CAD 
(Computer Aided Design) and am familiar with the software package and the files it generates.  I 
have used SolidWorks for approximately one year. 
7. I understand that certain Altium, LT Spice, and SolidWorks files from my Uber 
computer were produced in this action because they match certain file names that Waymo has 
provided for a search of Uber’s files or they were MD5 hash matches for certain files Waymo 
identified.  I have reviewed the list of files produced from my Uber computer.  Below I explain 
these files and why the file name or hash matches do not establish that these files came from 
Waymo, which they did not.   
8. One category of files produced from my computer is Altium tutorial files.  
Examples of these files are: 512KBits_I2C_EEPROM.Harness, Fabrication.OutJob, 
Flash.Harness, and Top.SchDoc.  These files came with the Altium software.   
9. Another category of files produced from my computer is ODB++ output files.  
These files are named attrlist, netlist, standard, matrix, feature and stephdr.  These are standard 
default file names, so it is unsurprising that there would be a file name match between my Altium 
files and a Google user’s Altium files. 
10. Attrlist is an attributes file that contains generic design information.  There is an 
attrlist associated with each layer of a circuit board.  The attributes described are generic and 
generally reveal only that a particular layer exists.  They are akin to metadata.  Parameters of 
these aspects of a printed circuit board, or “PCB,” remain in the default setting for many projects.  
If someone at Google also uses a default setting, then the attrlist output would be the same and 
there would be identical content and a hash match. 
11. Netlist is a file that describes connectivity between different components of a PCB.  
I understand that there are no netlist files of mine that were hash matches for a Google file.  This 
makes sense because netlist contains unique design information. 
12. Standard is the default font and a file named “standard” is generated as an output 
of the ODB++.  If someone at Google uses the default font, there would be a file name match. 
13. Matrix is a file that has definitions of the physical order of the layers and the 
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relation of drill layers.  I understand that there were only file name matches, and no hash matches, 
on my matrix files.  File name matches are expected because matrix is a default file name.   
14. Feature is a file that describes the PCB layer features. I understand that there were 
file name matches on my files for feature.  File name matches are expected because feature is a 
default file name.  I understand that there are no feature files of mine that were hash matches for a 
Google file.  This makes sense because feature files contain unique design information. 
15. Stephdr is a file that is generated as an output of the ODB++.  I do not know what 
the file contains.   
16. Another category of documents is harness files.  They identify the signals that are 
assigned to the harness.  Harnesses are basic and can be used for a wide variety of devices.  They 
can define very common groupings of signals.  It is unsurprising that there would be file name or 
even hash matches given the standard file name and the generic nature of the file. 
17. Another category of files is PrjPcbStructure files.  This is a standard filetype.  The 
file describes the hierarchy of the schematic documents in a project.  Simple projects with 
standard project file names may end up generating the same content; it's unsurprising that there 
would be a handful of identical files and hash matches.   
18. Another category is SVN generated files, which have a .svn-base file extension.  
These files are copies of other files that have been renamed by the SVN application.  These 
matches are explained above.  As an example, a file called 
faf2356ddd659fa6a7832d67738db968810476f5.svn-base is a renamed copy of a Harness file 
called ATC-PCB-0021_AD16488.Harness.    
19. I understand that files on my computer containing .asc were file name matches.  
These files came with the LTspice software. 
20. I understand that the following files on my computer were file name matches:  
pcb.sldprt, rotor.sldprt, and base.sldprt.  These files are Solidworks example or sample files that 
are shipped with the software. 
21. I also understand that files named Amp.SchDoc, Apd.SchDoc, Laser.SchDoc, 
Receiver.PcbDoc, Receiver.SchDocCAN.SchDoc, Ethernet.SchDoc, connector.PcbLib, 
Case 3:17-cv-00939-WHA   Document 177-5   Filed 04/07/17   Page 4 of 5
 LINAVAL DECL. ISO DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
Case No. 3:17-cv-00939-WHA 4
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
connector.SchLib, and connector.SchDoc were file name matches. These files use a standard 
naming convention that includes a functional description of the file.   These are commonly used 
file names, and it is unsurprising that there are file name matches.   
22. On a clean, previously unused Microsoft Windows virtual machine loaded with 
Altium, LTSpice, I prepared three dummy projects and generated outputs to demonstrate that files 
of the type found on my computer are routine Altium outputs.  The first project is a very simple 
hierarchical PCB project containing a few simple electrical components and two harness 
declarations.  The hierarchy is set up with top as the top level and other two schematics as sub-
schematics.  There is very limited connectivity described within the schematics.  From this, a 
PCB document file was created, which displays a sample PCB layout.  There is an output job file 
with the suffix out job.  That file is used to generate the ODB++ outputs, which also reside within 
the project.  This is simplest possible hierarchical schematic with harness declarations.  The 
second and third projects are nonhierarchical versions of the same project.  Instead of two harness 
declarations, I included one of each type.  I provided the virtual machine containing the design 
applications, and these dummy files to Stroz Friedberg so that it could determine whether the 
outputs were hash or file name matches for the alleged Waymo trade secret files.  The dummy 
files have been labeled UBER00005478 to UBER00005733. 
23. None of the documents that were produced from my computers originated at 
Google or Waymo.  To my knowledge, I did not bring any confidential or proprietary files from 
Google or Waymo to Otto or Uber. I have never used any Google or Waymo information during 
my employment at Uber and, before this lawsuit, I had never heard of the 14,000 files allegedly 
downloaded by Anthony Levandowski.  I have never seen any evidence of any use of Google or 
Waymo information during my employment at Uber. 
I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the 
foregoing is true and correct.  Executed this 6th day of April, 2017, in San Francisco, California. 
 
       
Asheem Linaval  
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 
WAYMO LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,  
OTTOMOTTO LLC; OTTO TRUCKING LLC, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 3:17-cv-00939-WHA 
[PROPOSED] ORDER DENYING 
PLAINTIFF WAYMO LLC’S 
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
 
Trial Date: October 2, 2017 
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Having considered all of the papers filed in connection with Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. No. 24), as well as the arguments presented by the parties at the 
hearing on this motion, the Court finds the following: 
• Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its 
patent and trade secret claims; 
• Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a likelihood of irreparable harm; 
• The balance of the hardships favors denial of Plaintiff’s motion;  
• The public interest would best be served by a not issuing a preliminary injunction; 
and 
• Plaintiff has failed to carry its burden of establishing that it is entitled to the 
provisional relief sought.   
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is 
DENIED.   
 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated: _____________, 2017 
 HONORABLE WILLIAM ALSUP 
United States District Court Judge 
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